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Beneficial and Needed—Both 




The civilian oversight of law enforcement movement in the 
United States is expanding and evolving.  In conjunction with 
human rights and human relations commissions, oversight 
organizations work to ensure that community members’ civil 
rights are respected, probing issues of disparate treatment, 
racial profiling, and excessive use of force in the law 
enforcement agencies they oversee. 
Oversight is becoming integrated into the fabric of our 
society and government; there is recognition that oversight is 
beneficial and here to stay.  Community members are calling 
for independent oversight and a voice in policing.  In increasing 
numbers, police chiefs, sheriffs and government officials are 
recognizing that oversight is ―not about bad cops, but about 
good government.‖1  More and more police officials are realizing 
that internal investigations are controversial and thankless.  
An oversight agency decreeing that a shooting or use of force 
was within acceptable policy guidelines has more credibility 
than an internal investigation making the same 
pronouncement.  A negative ruling bolstered by an independent 
investigation helps to take the sting out of a contentious 
disciplinary action.  Oversight in its many forms provides 
accountability and transparency for police issues that are 
otherwise inaccessible to the larger community. 
 

   Barbara Attard is a private oversight and accountability consultant 
with a 25-year career in oversight of law enforcement.  Attard is a past 
president and member of the board of directors of the National Association 
for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement.  Her website is 
http://www.accountabilityassociates.org.  
1. A phrase coined by John Crew, former Acting Director and Police 
Practices Director, Northern California Chapter of the American Civil 
Liberties Union (NC ACLU).  The NC ACLU has been instrumental in 
advocating for and establishing oversight and promoting police accountability 
in northern California for many decades. 
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This article presents information about the current status 
of the oversight movement, gives an overview of the models of 
oversight in the United States, discusses the benefits and 
essential elements of oversight, and provides an insight into 
the work being done by the National Association for Civilian 
Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) to establish 
standards and further the oversight profession. 
 
I. Oversight of Policing 
 
The models of civilian oversight in the United States vary 
greatly. There are no federal or state standards to guide local 
governments seeking to establish oversight.  The genesis of 
oversight varies as well and can influence the type of program 
developed.  Oversight can be established as a response to 
problems within a law enforcement agency or to community 
demand for independent civilian review, or a city or law 
enforcement agency can proactively develop a model that it 
believes is appropriate for its jurisdiction.  Oversight has 
become an integral part of municipal governments in most 
large cities in the United States, with some smaller 
municipalities and counties developing agencies to allow 
community members to weigh in on policing as well.2  County 
agencies with jurisdiction over sheriff’s offices have authority 
to review incidents that take place in custodial as well as patrol 
settings. 
Scholars and researchers in the field state that there are 
between two and four general models of oversight,3 although 
more and more agencies developed in the last ten years employ 
hybrid models, encompassing the ―best attributes‖ of several 
models.  The authority of oversight agencies ranges from 
 
2. The resource page on the website for the National Association for 
Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE), 
http://nacole.org/resources (last visited Sept. 9, 2010), contains a list with 114 
links to cities and counties in the United States that have oversight, as well 
as one university, UC Berkeley Police Review Board.  See also CITIZEN 
OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT xiii, 4 (Justina Cintron Perino ed., 2007) 
[hereinafter CITIZEN OVERSIGHT].  
3. PETER FINN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CITIZEN REVIEW OF POLICE: 
APPROACHES & IMPLEMENTATION vii (2001), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184430.pdf.  See also CITIZEN OVERSIGHT, 
supra note 2, at 11.  
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/12
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appeal panels, to investigative agencies, to auditor/monitor 
organizations, to civilian boards that have the ability to weigh 
in on misconduct and discipline.  Based on my experience, 
there are three basic forms of oversight: (1) investigative; (2) 
boards and commissions; and (3) auditor/monitor agencies.  
Many cities have variations on two or three of the models 
incorporated into their ―accountability systems.‖ 
In some cities, appointed monitors have been installed by 
the Department of Justice or through a consent decree.  
Appointed monitors work to solve problems in law enforcement 
agencies with extreme issues of excessive force, death cases, or 
corruption.  The appointed monitors work in conjunction with 
the established oversight body or independently to focus on 
specific issues and problems.4 
The efficacy of oversight organizations is difficult to 
measure—this may be due in part to the many goals of 
oversight, some of which may be conflicting.  A tension exists 
between the two objectives of impartially evaluating 
complaints and responding to community interests.5  Focus 
points for evaluating oversight cover a wide range, from 
―sustained case‖ rates, to increasing community confidence in 
the police service, to making policy recommendations that can 
effect organizational change.6  Visibility is important; some 
agencies are relatively unknown to the communities they serve, 
while others are at the forefront, conducting active outreach 
and public relations programs.  Again, there is no standard for 
measurement. 
 
A. Investigative Agencies 
 
Many oversight programs in large cities are investigative 
models.  These agencies generally have original jurisdiction of 
complaints, have the authority to collect evidence, interview 
witnesses—including officers and deputies—and make 
 
4. The NACOLE website lists four current appointed monitors in the 
cities of Detroit, Cincinnati and Oakland, and the New Jersey State Police, 
and four past appointed monitors in the cities of Los Angeles and Pittsburgh, 
the Metropolitan District of Columbia Police and Prince George’s County. 
5. CITIZEN OVERSIGHT, supra note 2, at 22. 
6. SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 135, 
144 (2005). 
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findings.  In jurisdictions that include a board or commission as 
the adjudicatory body, investigations are conducted by civilian 
staff and findings are ruled on by a commission or review board 
following a hearing. 
Investigative authority greatly strengthens an oversight 
body. Investigative agencies ―frame‖ the investigation by 
determining the allegations, witnesses to be interviewed, and 
questions to be asked.  Witnesses may be more forthcoming or 
even willing to be involved in an investigation if it is being 
conducted by an independent agency separate from the law 
enforcement agency.  Investigative methods, skill level, and 
creative, attentive vigor influence the thoroughness and, in 
many instances, the outcome of the case. 
 
B. Civilian Review Boards and Commissions 
 
Police review boards and commissions were some of the 
earliest models of oversight developed in the United States, 
some dating back to the civil rights and free speech movements 
of the 1950s and 60s.7  Authority of police review commissions 
varies, ranging from appeal boards that review cases brought 
by disgruntled complainants or officers, to boards that hear 
evidence and make findings in misconduct investigations 
conducted by their staff or an internal affairs bureau. 
Usually political appointees, commissioners are generally 
selected by mayors, elected city councils or county supervisors.  
A challenge presented by the board and commission form of 
oversight is that there are usually no standards for 
appointment of members of the oversight body; they often have 
a wide array of skills and analytical ability.  It is incumbent 
upon the staff and the agency to ensure that board members 
receive training regarding their authority, police practices, 
investigative procedures, and ethics involved in their positions, 
 
7. The Kansas City Office of Citizen Complaints recently celebrated 40 
years of continuous oversight; the Berkeley Police Review Commission was 
established through a voter initiative in 1973; the San Francisco Police 
Commission, established in 1856, has broad authority over the Office of 
Citizen Complaints and the Police Department, and holds hearings on serious 
misconduct cases (the role and the makeup of the commission has evolved 
over the years and continues to change). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/12
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as well as ample documentation and information upon which to 
base their decisions.8 
Boards and commissions can greatly enhance community 
confidence in a law enforcement agency; members of the public 
are empowered to hear cases and weigh in on policy 
recommendations, which engenders public trust and provides 
an avenue of access to those who may otherwise feel 
disenfranchised. 
One powerful aspect of boards and commissions is that 
historically they have conducted their hearings and business in 
public, providing transparency and accountability.  In 
California, this valuable public process has been eliminated 
due to the California Supreme Court decision in Copley Press v. 
Superior Court.9  Oversight boards must now hold their 
hearings behind closed doors and the information that can be 
made public is now restricted.  Some other states have more 
transparency regarding police officer discipline and 
misconduct.10 
 
C. Auditor/Monitor Model11 
 
Auditor/monitor oversight agencies review and analyze 
internal affairs investigations of police misconduct and have 
broad authority to evaluate policies and procedures of law 
enforcement organizations with an eye toward preventing 
future misconduct.  It is a newer form of oversight, developed 
since the 1990s, and it involves auditors typically overseeing 
 
8. CITIZEN OVERSIGHT, supra note 2, at 29. 
9. On August 31, 2006, the California Supreme Court, in Copley Press, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d 288 (Cal. 2006), held that records of an 
administrative appeal of sustained misconduct charges are confidential and 
may not be disclosed to the public.  The decision prevents the public from 
learning the extent to which police officers have been disciplined as a result 
of misconduct. 
10. Philadelphia’s Police Advisory Commission posts its hearing 
findings, including officers’ names, on its website.  Police Advisory 
Commission, Hearings and Opinions, 
http://www.phila.gov/pac/Hearings_and_Opinion.html (last visited Mar. 27, 
2010). 
11. The use of the term monitor in this context does not refer to a DOJ 
or court-appointed monitor.  In this article the description ―appointed 
monitor‖ will be used when referring to such an entity. 
5
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the internal complaint process to ensure that misconduct 
investigations are conducted in a fair and thorough manner.  In 
many jurisdictions the auditor may sit in on officer or witness 
interviews and present questions to be asked.  Disagreements 
between the auditor and internal affairs can be appealed, but 
in most organizations the police chief or the city manager has 
final authority. 
A strength of the auditor model is the ability to review all 
complaints and analyze trends and patterns of misconduct.  
Effective agencies utilize this information to generate reports 
and effect change in the police agency or in dealing with 
problematic officer/unit conduct.  The more effective 
auditor/monitor oversight agencies have been fortified with the 
authority to delineate allegations, classify investigations, and 
conduct investigations in cases that internal affairs either 
refuses to investigate or investigated in a less than thorough 
manner. 
 
II. Oversight of Policing in Contrast to Oversight of 
Correctional Institutions 
 
Oversight of jails and prisons has much in common with 
oversight of law enforcement.  Correctional institutions have 
some of the same power over inmate’s lives as sheriff’s deputies 
and police officers have over the lives of members of the public.  
Both law enforcement officers and correctional officers have 
enforcement authority and are empowered to use force. 
Prison and jail officials have the added insulation of 
ultimate authority behind closed doors.  The ―code of silence‖ 
that keeps misconduct issues from coming to light can be even 
stronger in closed institutions.12  Our society grants law 
enforcers and officers who maintain our prison and jail systems 
awesome powers to keep our streets safe and our society in 
check.  By the same token, oversight has emerged as one of the 
checks and balances to ensure that our police, sheriffs, and 
correctional institutions do not exceed or abuse the authority 
 
12. JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, CONFRONTING 
CONFINEMENT: A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN 
AMERICA’S PRISONS 94 (2006), available at 
http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/Confronting_Confinement.pdf.  
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/12
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granted to them. 
There are some obvious differences in the two related 
professions, which impact oversight of the respective fields.  
Officials in custodial settings are responsible for health care, 
housing, and classification in addition to keeping the peace.  
Thus, oversight in the custodial setting has wider jurisdictional 
authority and challenges.  The custody context includes issues 
related to housing inmates that are not as common in oversight 
of law enforcement—including housing decisions and 
classification of inmates, inmate-on-inmate violence, violence 
by guards against prisoners, and inmate suicides. 
Because prisons by their nature are closed institutions, for 
the most part with few non-prison employees walking through 
them, to be effective, those who have oversight authority of 
correctional institutions must have the ―golden key‖—the 
ability to conduct regular, non-routine inspections of the 
facilities.  The overseers must have access to prisoner 
grievances and all areas of the prisons.13  Because it is 
important to have regular access and non-prison eyes and ears 
inside the institution, some oversight officials actually house 
their investigators in the custodial setting rather than in an 
office outside of the institution.14 
Both external law enforcement and custodial officers are 
often resistant to oversight.  Many officers feel that unless 
someone has ―walked in my shoes‖ they do not have the proper 
perspective or knowledge to question them or fairly evaluate 
their work.  Yet, as oversight of law enforcement becomes an 
integral part of government in the United States, the benefits 
of oversight are being acknowledged.  Those in policing are 
recognizing that allowing independent oversight and 
community access to this information leads to increased 
confidence in the process and the law enforcement 
 
13. Id. at 80. 
14. The Los Angeles Office of Independent Review (OIR) monitors 
investigations of misconduct by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department 
(LASD).  The OIR was created by the Board of Supervisors at the request of 
Sheriff Lee Baca, and has been given the tools to effectively evaluate the 
LASD response to misconduct allegations, including resources, complete 
access to Department records and personnel, and the full support of LASD 
management.  The OIR has investigator offices inside the county jail facility.  
See OFFICE OF INDEP. REVIEW, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, FIRST REPORT, 
available at http://www.laoir.com/report1.pdf. 
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organization. 
 
III. The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law 
Enforcement (NACOLE) 
 
NACOLE is a national organization that serves the 
oversight community in the United States.  A ―virtual‖ 
organization, NACOLE’s board of directors, with members 
representing oversight agencies across the nation, works to 
further the goals of the organization—to support oversight 
practitioners and improve policing and police accountability.  
NACOLE’s website (www.nacole.org) contains resource 
documents and links providing information to those 
establishing or researching oversight issues.  An email group 
delivers multiple articles daily regarding policing and oversight 
issues in the United States and internationally. 
NACOLE’s annual professional development conferences 
provide training, certification, and credentialing opportunities, 
offer panel discussions and workshops to keep attendees up to 
date on developments in the field and programs in other 
agencies, and feature inspirational keynote speakers who make 
presentations on best practices and critical issues related to the 
work of oversight.  The conferences invite dialogue and 
networking, and challenge attendees to see their work with 
new insights and ideas. 
In addition to training and certification, NACOLE has 
worked to move the field of oversight beyond the developmental 
stage in which each agency and organization must create 
policies and practices from whole cloth.  The NACOLE Code of 
Ethics for Oversight, ratified by the membership at the 2006 
NACOLE Conference, has been adopted by many oversight 
agencies.  The professional standards committee has developed 
standards for executive directors and investigators in the field.  
NACOLE has recently launched a mentoring program to assist 
those new in the field to develop one-on-one relationships with 
experienced practitioners, in order to enhance their careers and 
advance the ideals of the profession and the association. 
NACOLE’s strategic plan includes ―growing‖ the 
organization by securing funding to open a national office to 
better serve the oversight constituency.  NACOLE receives 
calls and inquiries on a regular basis from community groups 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/12
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and government officials on all levels seeking assistance to set 
up an oversight agency or restructure an agency that is no 
longer effective.  In order to meet these needs NACOLE is 
working to develop capacity to conduct research on best 
practices and assemble technical assistance teams to respond 
to inquiries and calls for information from jurisdictions 
working to start up or redefine their oversight programs. 
 
IV. What is Needed for Effective Oversight Programs 
 
Oversight faces many challenges.  As mentioned 
previously, there are no set standards for models or procedures.  
Oversight practitioners work in a minefield of stakeholders 
who often have conflicting interests: law enforcement officials 
who do not want to give up their authority to rule on 
complaints and discipline their members; outwardly hostile 
police unions; city and county attorneys that see independent 
oversight and transparency as a liability; government officials 
who want the image of accountability but are reluctant to back 
the agency with adequate authority and funding; and 
community members who often do not understand the 
limitations of oversight.  In order to succeed, regardless of the 
model of oversight, there are key factors that must be present 
to enable the oversight agency to overcome the challenges it 
will inevitably meet and to credibly do its job. 
 
A. Political Will 
 
Without the political will to support independent 
oversight, the agency will flounder and fight a constant uphill 
battle to make the changes needed to correct problems in the 
law enforcement agency it oversees.  Oversight is most often 
created in a time of crisis.  Whether it is the result of public 
outrage over a questionable police shooting, or a response to 
the sustained action of a particular community group that feels 
victimized by disparate treatment, it usually takes political 
pressure to move government officials to establish independent 
oversight.  Public safety is most important for politicians; they 
do not want to appear soft on crime or not supportive of law 
enforcement.  Oversight agencies and their recommendations 
can sometimes be portrayed as anti-police in efforts to 
9
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undermine their authority.  The backing of courageous 
politicians who value independence, accountability, and 




The organization must have ample authority to provide a 
credible service to the community it serves.  Agencies that have 
investigative authority must have the ability to interview all 
witnesses, including officers, and have access to all documents 
needed to complete their investigations.  Auditor/monitor 
agencies must have the ability to correct deficient 
investigations either by requiring further investigation or 
having the authority to conduct an independent investigation.  
Boards and commissions must have the ability to initiate 
change within the department it oversees.  The creation of an 
oversight agency is usually a process that involves community 
support and action, and with it community expectations are 
raised.  In order for the oversight agency to be effective and 
maintain the support of the community it serves, it must have 
ample authority to make a change, when needed, in the law 




Oversight programs must have adequate funding and 
spending authority to complete the work outlined in the 
enabling legislation. 
Oversight agencies must have funding and authority to 
hire staff at a level that allows timely and thorough 
investigation (or review).  If there is an appeals process, the 
staff must be able to analyze the investigation and prepare 
documentation for the appellate body in a timely manner.  
Some agencies have staffing ratios written into the enabling 
legislation.15 
The agency must have funding to purchase and utilize 
databases to track all aspects of complaints.  Complaints are 
 
15. FINN, supra note 3, at 89.  A San Francisco voter initiative in 1996 
amended the S.F. Charter to require the San Francisco Office of Citizen 
Complaints to have one investigator for every 150 police officers. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/12
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important quality-control indicators, and the statistical 
information they provide, if properly gathered and analyzed, 
provides invaluable tools for police managers and government 
officials to identify potential areas for remediation.  This data 
can identify specific police practices, such as ―stop and frisk‖ 
detentions, consent searches, and discretionary arrests, which 
give rise to complaints, along with police units or commands 
where patterns of police-civilian interactions merit closer 
examination.  Complaints should be seen as one factor in the 
assessment of an officer or a working unit or team—a factor 
that is taken seriously as an indicator in how an officer is 
handling interactions with those with whom he or she comes 
into contact. 
Oversight agencies should have the authority and funding 
to hire outside consultants, including independent counsel.  At 
times policy recommendations must be supported by outside 
consultants to be effectively presented.  City and county 
counsel offices, who represent the larger jurisdiction and may 
be defending the law enforcement agency against law suits, 
often have a conflict of interest and do not independently 
represent the oversight agency—particularly in times of 
controversy.  Inadequate legal representation can result in 
decisions being made without all of the relevant issues being 
vetted. 
 
D. Policy Recommendations 
 
Policy review is widely seen as one of the most important 
aspects of an oversight program in that it can effect 
organizational change in the law enforcement agency.  It is 
imperative that the changes are adopted by the agency and 
that there is ongoing monitoring to ensure that there is follow 




Outreach to the community is essential.  Members of the 
public, possible complainants, and all stakeholders must be 
aware of the program and its benefits.  Through outreach the 
 
16. WALKER, supra note 6. 
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organization can inform the community of the authority and 
limitations of the program.  Outreach should include both the 
larger community as well as members of the law enforcement 
agency and labor organizations—this will help establish and 




A benefit of oversight is shining a light on otherwise closed 
institutions.  Investigations of police misconduct were 
historically the purview only of internal investigators and were 
handled by the department brass.  Jails and prisons have 
historically been closed institutions with little or no oversight.  
The growth in oversight has, through periodic reporting, 
increased the amount of available information about the 
organization or facility under scrutiny.  Annual reports provide 
a level of transparency and accountability to the community, as 
they give insight into their law enforcement organization.  
Reporting also increases public confidence in the oversight 
agencies, as much of the work that they do is protected and 
must be kept confidential.  While privacy laws prohibit the 
reporting of names or specific case information in many 
jurisdictions, information on complaint numbers, trends, types 
of complaints, policy recommendations and follow-up go a long 
way to providing information about the process and 
establishing a historical context and baseline for future 




More and more oversight agencies are establishing 
mediation as a method of resolving complaints.  While 
programs differ in determining types of cases that can be 
mediated, traditional misconduct investigations can have 
limited efficacy in complaints that are one-on-one and relate to 
discourtesy or a poor attitude. The majority of such cases result 
in a finding of ―not sustained‖ (insufficient evidence), an 
outcome that is not satisfactory to either party and has no 
value in modifying conduct.  In successfully mediated 
complaints, both the complainant and the officer can gain an 
understanding of why the other person acted as he or she did. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/12
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This understanding can change behavior in a more meaningful 
and effective way than is possible in the disciplinary process. 
 
V. Oversight – A Changing Profession in a Changing World 
 
Oversight of law enforcement has blossomed, emerging as 
a strong force for change, accountability, and transparency in 
the last forty years.  The proliferation of oversight agencies is, 
in part, the result of increased information and communication 
disseminated via the media and the Internet—bringing issues 
of police misconduct, civil rights, and disparate treatment of 
members of the community into our homes on a daily basis. 
Changes in our culture resulting from the advent of the 
Internet are dramatically impacting the world of oversight.  
The transparency and support provided by strong investigative 
journalism departments has traditionally worked to strengthen 
oversight.  The evening news and daily newspapers have 
historically delved deep into police issues—investigative 
reporters have been at the forefront, with breaking news 
stories about use of force, unwarranted shootings or corruption 
within a police agency.  Today newspapers are fading, in 
numbers and span of influence; the internet is taking the place 
of the daily news, particularly for those under the age of thirty. 
What is emerging is Twitter, cell phone cameras, blogs, 
and the internet.  Word travels fast—across the country and 
around the world.  Oversight agencies are stepping up and 
putting the word out on Twitter to find witnesses.  Cell phone 
camera videos of police use of force, even shootings, are posted 
and broadcast world wide.  Police departments are now placing 
video cameras in police vehicles and officers’ lapels.  
Surveillance cameras are posted on many storefronts and 
intersections.  There is more evidence—and real-time 
documentation of incidents.  It is a new world, maybe one that 
will be more attuned to transparency and accountability.  
Oversight agencies must be keenly aware of and adapt to the 
changes in the global landscape. 
The goals of oversight—improving policing and increasing 
accountability—are laudable and congruent with those of 
modern policing and community values.  While it can be 
difficult to navigate between stakeholders, all of the 
constituencies weighing in on oversight serve an important 
13
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function in maintaining a balance.  Layers of review, both 
internal and independent, and input and vigilance from the 
community, work together to ensure that law enforcement is 
responsive to the needs of the community it serves. 
In the end it is political will that will determine whether 
oversight is successful.  An agency can have the ultimate 
authority, yet if it does not have the support of those in power, 
it will not succeed.  Oversight can be undermined by 
appointments of ineffective or inept directors or commissioners, 
cuts in funding, inadequate authority, or failure to obtain 
support for its recommendations and findings.  In order for the 
civilian oversight movement to succeed in transforming law 
enforcement, it must be backed by legislators on all levels who 
are not afraid to confront issues of police misconduct and who 
embrace the values of independent oversight. 
 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/12
